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a b s t r a c t 
The organization of collective action is extremely important for societies. A main reason 
is that many of the key problems societies face are public good problems. We present 
results from a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects. Our 
results demonstrate that large groups, in which the impact of an individual contribution 
( MPCR ) is almost negligible, are able to provide a public good in the same way as small 
groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is much higher. Nevertheless, we 
ﬁnd that small variations in MPCR in large groups have a strong effect on contributions. 
We develop a hypothesis concerning the interplay between MPCR and group size, which is 
based on the assumption that the salience of the advantages of mutual cooperation plays a 
decisive role. This hypothesis is successfully tested in a second series of experiments. Since 
Mancur Olson’s “Logic of collective action” it is a commonly held belief that in large groups 
the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Our results, 
however, suggest that the chance to successfully organize collective action of large groups 
and to solve important public good problems is much higher than previously thought. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
The organization of collective action is extremely important for societies. A main reason is that many of the key prob- 
lems societies face are public good problems. Let us consider two prominent examples. In many cases, solving environmental 
problems requires collective action, because environmental goods are often public goods. When environmental problems are 
international, such as the climate problem, national government interventions are not enough. What is needed is cooper- 
ation by large groups of people. This is also the basis for producing another, highly important public good: democracy. A 
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functioning democracy requires that a large group of citizens does not only make use of their right to vote, but is also pre- 
pared to inform themselves about politically relevant issues and to participate in the process of democratic decision-making. 
Expressed in the terms of contemporary experimental research on public good provision, these kinds of problems concern 
large groups with a low marginal per capita return ( MPCR ) on contributions to the public good. There is a very large body 
of literature dealing with public good experiments. 1 But due to capacity limits (e.g., lab space and number of subjects avail- 
able) and budget constraints, nearly all of these experiments are conducted with small groups and high MPCR . In this paper, 
we report a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects, in which the impact of an individual 
contribution is almost negligible. We provide the ﬁrst systematic investigation of public good problems with large groups 
with low MPCR s based on a design that is comparable to that employed in the many previous experiments investigating 
small groups. 
The ﬁrst question we investigate is based on Mancur Olson’s book “The logic of collective action”, published in 1965. 
Mancur Olson’s theory has had a decisive inﬂuence on the scientiﬁc understanding of the public good problem – not only 
in economics. His main hypothesis concerns large groups. In large, latent groups, the contribution that an individual can 
make to the public good is so small that it is hardly noticed by the other group members. Olson concludes that cooperative 
behavior in large groups is therefore not rational – not even for people with altruistic preferences. 2 Olson’s conclusion is 
therefore: “The larger a group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the 
less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good. In short, the larger the group, the less it will 
further its common interest.” (p. 36) In this paper, we report on the results of two experimental research projects. In the 
ﬁrst project, we particularly focus on what we call the “Olson hypothesis”: 
“Large groups with a very low MPCR close to zero are unlikely to provide the public good.”
This hypothesis has far-reaching implications. It suggests, that problems of the kind mentioned above will be exceedingly 
diﬃcult to solve, if not insurmountable. If Olson’s logic of collective action holds, signiﬁcant contributions to a public good 
are unlikely to occur in large groups. 
We ask whether this hypothesis is correct and conduct experiments with large groups of 60 and 100 and very low MPCR s 
of 0.02 and 0.04. We develop a new connected-lab design, which allows running the experiment under laboratory conditions 
with subjects interacting simultaneously in real time. We ﬁnd that the Olson hypothesis cannot be conﬁrmed. Large groups 
of 60 or 100 members and with low MPCR are able to create a public good in the same way as small groups with high 
MPCR . 
One may argue that experiments with small groups with rather high MPCR s of around 0.4 already provide a test of 
Olson’s theory 3 . After all, theory predicts that any group with an MPCR smaller than one will not provide the public good. 
But, although experiments with small groups have shown that the Nash-equilibrium of no cooperation cannot be observed, 
this does not rule out that the Nash-equilibrium will be observed in large groups with low MPCR . The Olson hypothesis 
aims exactly at this combination of group size and MPCR value. In our view, this reﬂects the most common interpretation 
of Olson’s work. 
Two studies, namely by Isaac et al. (1994) and Diederich et al. (2016) , already consider public good games with large 
groups with 60 or more members. But their MPCR s of 0.30 and 0.75, respectively, are rather high. Diederich et al. (2016) ex- 
plicitly compare the cooperation of small and large groups using an internet-based design. They ﬁnd a positive group size 
effect. Larger groups reach higher degrees of eﬃciency. Although this is a very interesting ﬁnding (which is conﬁrmed in this 
study), their experiment is not designed to test the Olson hypothesis because the MPCR is too high. Isaac et al. (1994) im- 
plemented one treatment in which seven groups of 40 faced a very low MPCR of 0.03. Six of these groups participated in 
a multiple-session design (in which the ten rounds were played over several days) and were incentivized by extra credits 
while one group participated in a single-session design (in which the ten rounds were played “over a relatively brief time 
span”, p. 5) and was paid out in cash. The behavioral patterns observed by Isaac et al. (1994) for this treatment are gen- 
erally in line with the patterns found in small groups: average ﬁrst-round contributions are larger than zero and average 
contributions fall with repetition. 4 However, compared to treatments with equal group size but much higher MPCR s (0.30 
or 0.75), they ﬁnd a lower initial average contribution and a much faster decay of average contributions. In the one group 
with a single-session design, cooperation decreases to about 5% in round 5 and to 0% in the ﬁnal 10th round. This latter 
observation seems to be in line with Olson’s hypothesis, but is restricted to one group only. Furthermore, Schumacher et al. 
(2017) also use large groups (up to 32 subjects) but investigate a different research question. In their experiment, a subject 
could decide whether a good is provided that beneﬁts himself or one other person but creates costs for a group of people. 
The size of this group is varied. 
The second question we address in this paper is about the determinants of cooperation behavior of large groups: When 
does the organization of a collective interest succeed? The answer to this question is of eminent importance for modern 
societies, because it provides the basis for potential solutions for public good problems. 
1 For an early overview see Ledyard (1995) and for a more recent selective survey see Chaudhuri (2011) . 
2 “Selﬂess behavior that has no perceptible effect is sometimes not even considered praiseworthy. A man who tried to hold back a ﬂood with a pail 
would probably be considered more of a crank than a saint, …” ( Olson 1965 , p. 64). 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
4 This particularly holds for the six groups of the multi-session treatment who were incentivized by extra credits. 
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The results of our ﬁrst project not only reveal that large groups are just as capable of providing public goods as small 
groups. They also show that with a given MPCR the group effect is positive 5 (i.e., the groups of 100 make higher average 
contributions than the groups of 60) and that very small changes in the MPCR (i.e., the reduction from 4 cents per Euro 
investment to 2 cents per Euro) have large negative effects on contributions. These ﬁndings suggest that neither the group 
size alone nor the MPCR alone determines the contribution behavior. Rather, it depends on the interaction of both variables. 
In the second project we present, we derive a hypothesis, on how this interaction could look like. Based on the obser- 
vations of the ﬁrst project, we develop the thesis that the provision of public goods is driven by the salience of the mutual 
advantage of cooperation. 6 Our experimental ﬁndings suggest the MPCR -distance as a proxy for salience. The MPCR- distance 
is the difference between the MPCR used in the experiment and 1/ N , the minimum value of the MPCR necessary to create 
a public good problem. 7 The higher this distance, the more salient is the advantageousness of cooperative behavior. We 
successfully test this hypothesis in another series of experiments conducted in our second project. 
Our MPCR- distance explanation is not to be understood as a substitute for existing theories, which for example explain 
why contributions in repeated public good experiments are declining ( Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010 ). Rather, our explana- 
tion complements these theories as it accounts for the level of contributions. It describes the conditions under which the 
average level of contributions made by large groups is higher or lower, while Olson’s theory suggests that contributions are 
always zero when the MPCR is negligible. Our experiments suggest that members of large groups need to recognize that it 
is more beneﬁcial for everyone to cooperate in order to be willing to cooperate at all. This idea is of great social importance. 
It highlights that the beneﬁts of cooperation need to become widely known in order to foster cooperation of large groups. 
We will return to this point in the discussion section. 
The contribution of our paper is three-fold. First, we provide evidence that the Olson hypothesis does not hold. Second, 
we provide an explanation for observed behavior by identifying the salience of the mutual beneﬁts of cooperation as a 
driver of cooperative behavior. Third, we provide a methodological contribution as we develop a new connected-lab design 
that allows experiments with large groups to be run under controlled conditions. In all our treatments student subjects 
interact simultaneously and are incentivized with cash. Therefore, our results can be directly compared to the large body of 
evidence from experiments conducted with small groups. 8 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the design and the results of our experimental sessions run to 
test the Olson hypothesis. It also includes our conjecture on the speciﬁc interplay of MPCR and group size, which is based 
on these results. Section 3 presents the design and the results of our experimental sessions run to test this conjecture. 
Section 4 contains the discussion of our ﬁndings. 
2. Experimental test of the Olson hypothesis 
2.1. Design and procedure 
Our design is based on the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) introduced by Isaac et al. (1984) . Let z i denote the 
initial endowment of group member i, b i the individual contribution to the provision of the public good, and α the return 
every group member receives if one monetary unit is invested in the production of the public good. The marginal return on 
the share of z i that is not invested in the public good is normalized to 1. Then α is identical to the MPCR of investments in 
the public good. If N is the number of group members, group member i’ s payoff π i is 
πi = ( z i − b i ) + α
N ∑ 
j=1 
b j . (1) 
A cooperation problem arises if the following holds: 
α < 1 ;Nα > 1 and , thus , α > 1 /N. (1 ′ ) 
An individual investing one monetary unit in the public good receives a return of α. Since α < 1, not investing is more 
proﬁtable than investing from the individual’s point of view. The return of each monetary unit he keeps is equal to 1. 
However, since α > 1/ N , investing is eﬃcient from the group perspective. Clearly, the cooperation problem becomes more 
and more severe as α decreases, since the individual loss arising from contributing to the public good (1 – α) increases. 
5 As it is the case in Diederich et al. (2016) . 
6 Our notion of salience has some links to the burgeoning research ﬁeld analyzing the salience phenomenon – starting with Bordalo et al. (2012a, 
2012b ). Our research differs, however, in that we do not create salience by proposing two options a subject has to choose from. In contrast, we analyze in 
between-subject public good games whether different combinations of MPCR and group size are more salient than others by attracting players’ attention 
to the advantages of mutual cooperation. 
7 This holds if the return on the private good is normalized to 1. 
8 This differs from the design used by Isaac at al. (1994) and Diederich et al. (2016) in several ways. Most importantly, all sessions in Diederich et al. 
(2016) and most sessions in Isaac et al. (1994) are based on a multi-session design in which the experiment lasted over several days and in which the 
default of a subject’s decision was set to zero-contribution when he or she did not participate in a round. Isaac at al. (1994, p. 5) state, “Unfortunately, the 
effective size of laboratory experiments has been limited by both the expense of subject payments and by the capacity constraints of existing laborato- 
ries”. Therefore, for about 90% of their sessions they employ a multi-session design using extra-credit point incentives for volunteers from undergraduate 
microeconomic theory classes who sometimes took part in more than one session. 
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Fig. 1. The four connected laboratories in Germany. 
Table 1 
Treatment parameters and participants’ characteristics. 
Treatment N MPCR Sessions/indep. obs. Lab Age in years (mean) Female dummy (mean) 
8-0.25 8 0.25 8 Connected 23.297 0.547 
8-0.25-L 8 0.25 8/32 Local 22.773 0.590 
60-0.02 60 0.02 8 Connected 22.979 0.519 
60-0.04 60 0.04 8 Connected 23.125 0.517 
100-0.02 100 0.02 8 Connected 23.709 0.439 
100-0.04 100 0.04 8 Connected 23.169 0.487 
Note: The table shows the parameters of the six treatments. In each treatment, we conducted eight sessions. Due to 
no-shows, in two sessions of 100-0.02 less than 100 subjects participated (98 and 99). In seven sessions of 100-0.04 we 
had less than 100 participants (89, 93, 93, 96, 96, 97, and 99). The table also summarizes the average age of participants 
and the share of female participants. 
Due to ( 1 ′ ) the MPCR ( α) is bounded by 1/ N . In small groups, the value of the MPCR, therefore, has to be relatively high 
for a cooperation problem to arise, while this does not hold for large groups. 9 
Running large-group laboratory experiments for our ﬁrst project would have required a laboratory where 100 subjects 
could interact simultaneously. Given the limited capacity of seats in experimental laboratories, we set up a suﬃciently large 
virtual lab by connecting four different laboratories in Germany via the Internet. In all treatments – except for one small- 
group condition – we employed the connected-lab design: in this design, all groups consisted of subjects located at the 
laboratories of the Universities of Bonn, Duisburg-Essen, Göttingen, and Magdeburg (see Fig. 1 ) who simultaneously decided 
on their individual contributions to the public good. The laboratory in Magdeburg coordinated all the sessions. We used 
zTree ( Fischbacher, 2007 ) for obtaining subjects’ decisions and Skype for communicating between the laboratories. When 
entering the respective laboratory, subjects could see a (soundless) video conference of the four laboratories on a computer 
screen. Thus, each subject had the opportunity to verify that all laboratories were indeed connected and subjects were 
interacting simultaneously in real time. Subjects were not informed about the locations of the other laboratories. 
In all the treatments employed to test the Olson hypothesis, a standard linear ten-round public good game with partner- 
matching was played. The payoff function corresponds to ( 1 ) in all treatments, with z i = 120 Euro cents in each of the ten 
rounds. We collected data for eight groups in each treatment, i.e. we have eight independent observations per treatment. 
We conducted treatments with groups consisting of 8, 60, and 100 members (see Table 1 ). 10 Recall that due to ( 1 ′ ), the 
MPCR is bounded by 1/ N , i.e. we cannot run all small- and large-group sessions with the same low MPCR . For groups of 8, 
we conducted two treatments with an MPCR of 0.25 to test if the connected-lab design has an impact on behavior. As in all 
connected-design treatments, in 8-0.25, the members of each group were equally distributed over the four labs (i.e., in this 
9 See Appendix A for a discussion of the connection between Olson’s theory and the VCM literature. 
10 Because of no-shows, less than 100 subjects per group participated in two sessions of 100-0.02 and in seven sessions of 100-0.04, the average numbers 
being 99.625 and 95.375, respectively. All parameters based on group size were adapted in the respective sessions and subjects were informed about 
the correct number of participants. We also adjusted our data analyses accordingly. Since each individual decision in the ﬁrst round is an independent 
observation, we can check if groups of less than (but close to) 100 behaved differently from those with exactly 100 subjects. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant 
difference ( p = 0.136, n = 797 for 100-0.02 and p = 0.390, n = 763 for 100-0.04, two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests). 
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Fig. 2. Average share of contributions in treatments 8-0.25 and 8-0.25-L. 
Note: The graph shows the average contributions in each round as share of the endowment. 
treatment there were two subjects in each lab) whereas in the control treatment without a connected-lab design, 8-0.25-L, 
the eight subjects played locally in each of the labs. 
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects received written instructions. 11 Before the start of the ﬁrst round 
of the public good game, participants had to answer several questions concerning the payoff rules of the game in order to 
ensure that they had understood the game correctly. In all treatments, subjects were informed after each round about the 
amount they had kept, their own contribution, the average contribution to the public good of all group members 12 , their 
individual payoff from the public good, their individual earnings in the round just completed, and the cumulated earnings 
over all previous rounds. They knew that they would be re-matched with the same people in each round and that the 
experiment would be ﬁnished after ten rounds. After round 10, subjects were paid their earnings over all 10 rounds in cash 
and left. 
The sessions lasted for about 90 min and the average earning was 15.23 Euros. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE 
( Greiner, 2015 ). A total of 2,840 different subjects participated in the six treatments and each subject participated in one 
session only. All sessions were run according to the same protocol. 
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Impact of connected-lab design 
In our ﬁrst project, before testing the Olson hypothesis, we also study whether the connected-lab design has an impact 
on subjects’ behavior using small groups. First, we ﬁnd the behavior in treatments 8-0.25 and 8-0.25-L follows the same 
pattern of contribution decline that is typically found in ten-round public good experiments with small groups of N ≤10 
and MPCR s ≥ 0.30 (cf. Footnote 1): on average, contributions start somewhere between 30% and 50% of the endowment and 
then decrease from round to round. In our treatments, average ﬁrst-round contributions are 41.8% and 39.1% in 8-0.25 and 
8-0.25-L, and decrease to 12.6% and 14.6%, respectively, with overall average cooperation rates of 26.9% and 26.1% ( Fig. 2 
and Table 2 ). Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that average contributions are unaffected by the treatment variation. 
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between local groups and groups in the virtual lab, neither regarding average contributions 
over all ten rounds nor concerning average contributions in each of the rounds. 13 From a methodological point of view, this 
ﬁnding is good news because it appears that the capacity of laboratories can be multiplied by connecting them virtually 
without inducing signiﬁcant behavioral effects. 
2.2.2. Testing the Olson hypothesis 
The Olson hypothesis says that large groups with an MPCR close to zero are unlikely to provide the public good. In 
contrast, small groups with a much higher MPCR will be able to provide a considerable amount of it. In our experiment 
this would mean that average cooperation rates of large groups should not be signiﬁcantly different from zero. Furthermore, 
the cooperation rates should be signiﬁcantly smaller than those observed for small groups. We tested this hypothesis by 
using large groups of 60 and 100 subjects and very low MPCR s of 0.02 and 0.04 ( Table 1 ). Treatment 8-0.25 served as the 
benchmark condition for cooperation in small groups with an MPCR that is 12.5 and 6.25 times higher than in the large- 
group treatments. 
In all large groups, we ﬁnd considerable positive average ﬁrst-round contributions – between 26.3% and 39.1% ( Table 2 ), 
which are signiﬁcantly larger than zero; see the OLS-regressions in online Table C1 of Appendix C, columns (9), (10), (12), 
11 See Appendix B for instructions of treatment 100-0.02, as an example. 
12 Subjects knew that they would only receive aggregate information about the behavior of other group members and therefore were not able to identify 
others’ individual behavior. 
13 p > 0.264 for comparing contributions in each of the 10 rounds and p = 0.685 for comparing overall contributions (two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests). 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. 
Treatment Contributions 
Round 1 Round 10 All rounds 
8-0.25 0.418 0.126 0.269 
(0.127) (0.101) (0.110) 
8-0.25-L 0.391 0.146 0.261 
(0.13) (0.127) (0.146) 
60-0.02 0.263 0.028 0.111 
(0.047) (0.013) (0.021) 
60-0.04 0.356 0.075 0.202 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.019) 
100-0.02 0.321 0.037 0.134 
(0.047) (0.009) (0.021) 
100-0.04 0.391 0.077 0.228 
(0.053) (0.008) (0.031) 
Notes: The table shows the average contributions in 
rounds 1 and 10 as well as the average contribution 
over all rounds. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Fig. 3. Average share of contributions per round in large groups of 60 and 100 as well as in treatment 8-0.25. 
and (13). Average contributions over all rounds are between 11.1% and 22.8%. Moreover, we observe a pattern of contribution 
decline similar to that in our small groups. Average contributions in round 10 are between 2.8% and 7.7%. 14 In particular, the 
dynamics in 60-0.04 and 100-0.04 are rather similar to those in 8-0.25 ( Fig. 3 and online Table C1). Average contributions 
in 100-0.04 do not differ signiﬁcantly from those in 8-0.25 ( p = 0.208, n = 16, two-sided Mann–Whitney U test). 15 
Our ﬁndings above clearly contradict the Olson hypothesis that large groups with an MPCR close to zero are unlikely to 
provide the public good. 
We next analyze the group-size effect, i.e. the impact on cooperation of increasing group size from 60 to 100, while hold- 
ing the MPCR constant. We also study the MPCR -effect, i.e. how increasing the MPCR from 0.02 to 0.04 affects cooperation 
at a given group size. 
The group-size effect is positive, but moderate. Changing group size from 60 to 100 increases average contributions from 
11.1% (20.2%) to 13.4% (22.8%) for an MPCR of 0.02 (0.04) (see Table 2 ). 16 Columns (1) and (2) of online Table C3 show OLS 
regression results, revealing that increasing group size pushes up contributions in round 1 signiﬁcantly by 5.2 percent with 
an MPCR of 0.02 and by 4.0% with an MPCR of 0.04. With an MPCR of 0.02, contributions decay signiﬁcantly faster in the 
larger group, though. 
14 OLS-regressions reveal a quite similar decay across treatments of 3.1% of the endowment in 8-0.25 and between 2.3% and 3.5% in the large groups, 
again see online Table C1 of Appendix C. 
15 online Table C2 of Appendix C contains the full set of treatment comparison tests for contributions of the ﬁrst and the last period as well as for average 
contributions. 
16 For a given MPCR , average contributions are (weakly) signiﬁcantly lower in groups of 60 compared to groups of 100 ( p = 0.046 (0.093) for MPCR = 0.02 
(0.04), two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests). Comparing contributions round by round yields (weakly) signiﬁcant differences in seven rounds for an MPCR of 
0.02 ( p ≤ 0.093). For an MPCR of 0.04 only two rounds differ signiﬁcantly by group size ( p ≤ 0.093). 
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The MPCR -effect is positive and strong. Increasing the MPCR slightly from 0.02 to 0.04 leads to a highly signiﬁcant in- 
crease in average contributions from 13.4% (11.1%) to 22.8% (20.2%) in groups of 100 (60) (see Table 2 ). 17 OLS-regressions in 
columns (3) and (4) of online Table C3 show that raising the MPCR increases contributions in round 1 signiﬁcantly by 13.2% 
in groups of 60 and by 12.0% in groups of 100. In both cases, the larger MPCR is associated with a signiﬁcantly faster decay 
of contributions. 
While the positive MPCR effect is in line with the Olson hypothesis, the positive group-size effect seems to be counterin- 
tuitive in light of his argument. Moreover, it is not clear why small groups confronted with a high MPCR can achieve levels 
of cooperation similar to those of large groups confronted with very low MPCR s. The latter observation suggests that it is 
neither group size nor the value of MPCR alone that determines the level of cooperation, but a speciﬁc interplay of both. 
The conjecture that the interplay of group size and MPCR is decisive for cooperation in public good experiments is also 
implied by previous research. Isaac and Walker (1988) observe that the impact of varying the MPCR (0.3 vs. 0.75) depends 
on the size of the group: it is much stronger for a group of 4 than for a group of 10. While the authors refer to average 
contributions, the effects are already identiﬁable in the ﬁrst rounds. Another interesting observation made by the authors is 
that for a high MPCR of 0.75 the group-size effect is rather weak (and not signiﬁcant), but very strong for a low MPCR of 
0.3 (p. 191). 18 Isaac et al. (1984) make a similar observation, which is replicated in Isaac et al. (1994) , who summarize their 
ﬁndings in stating that behavior in public good games “is inﬂuenced by a subtle interaction between group size and MPCR 
rather than simply the sheer magnitude of either” (p. 32). 
Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) ﬁnd that for groups of 4 varying the MPCR (0.3, 0.5, and 0.75) has a positive but non-linear 
impact on contributions. Increasing the MPCR from 0.3 to 0.5 has a strong effect, while a further increase to 0.75 has a 
rather small effect. The differences between contributions already appear in the ﬁrst round of the experiment. The authors 
argue that the increase in contributions can be explained by the fact that a higher MPCR makes it more effective to invest 
in the public good. 19 However, this explanation cannot account for the decreasing strength of the MPCR -effect. Nosenzo et 
al. (2015) report that varying the size of small groups has a rather strong effect on contributions for a low MPCR of 0.3, but 
no signiﬁcant effect for a high MPCR of 0.75. 20 Diederich et al. (2016) found a signiﬁcant but weak group-size effect for an 
MPCR of 0.3 and groups of 10, 40, and 100 members. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the behavior we observed in the large groups is in line with the theory of 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) . This theory explains the decay of contributions during the course of public good exper- 
iments by social learning of the subjects. In particular, “conditional cooperators” learn that other subjects invest less than 
they invest and react to this experience with a reduction of their own contributions. This interplay of heterogeneous pref- 
erences and social learning also seems to be at work in the groups with 100 and 60 subjects. Although the theory of 
Fischbacher and Gächter is supported by the large group experiments we have to realize that this theory is not able to 
explain the interaction of the MPCR and group size. For this, it needs a complementary theoretical explanation, which we 
develop in the next sections. 
2.2.3. The interplay of MPCR and N: The MPCR-distance conjecture 
Based on our ﬁndings from the ﬁrst project, we provide a conjecture on how the MPCR and the group size might interact. 
This conjecture is different from the approaches suggested by previous research. We test it by running additional treatments 
that provide a more complex variation of group sizes N and MPCR s (see Section 3 ). The development of our conjecture and 
its experimental test is part of our second research project. 
Fig. 4 spans the N - MPCR space for representing the ﬁve connected-lab treatments conducted so far. The 1/ N curve reveals, 
for each group size, the minimal MPCR necessary to create a social dilemma situation. 21 For each treatment, the ﬁrst number 
in the yellow label displays the average overall contributions in percent. 
Fig. 4 reveals two remarkable observations concerning the vertical distance between the MPCR and 1/ N, which we will 
call the MPCR -distance ( d ) in the following . The yellow labels display the average contributions followed by the d values. 
First, reducing the MPCR at a given N from 0.04 to 0.02 results in a decrease in average contributions – yet in a way that 
contributions are lowest when the MPCR -distance is smallest, i.e. at 60-0.02, where d = 0.003. Second, when this distance 
is comparatively large at 8-0.25 ( d = 0.125), i.e. when reducing N to 8 and increasing the MPCR to 0.25 at the same time, 
average cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher than in the remaining treatments – with the exception of treatment 100-0.04, 
which has the largest value of d among the remaining treatments (online Table C2). Thus, our results suggest that increasing 
d has a positive but non-linear impact on contributions, which is also in line with the ﬁndings from the literature discussed 
in Section 2.2.2 . 
17 These differences are signiﬁcant at the one-percent level when comparing group averages between treatments ( p = 0.001, two-sided Mann–Whitney U 
tests). Comparing contributions round by round yields signiﬁcant differences by MPCR in all rounds ( p ≤ 0.036 for N = 100 and p ≤ 0.005 for N = 60). 
18 Eﬃciency concerns cannot explain this ﬁnding. For an MPCR of 0.3, the group payoff resulting from investing $1 each into the public good is $1.20 in 
a group of 4 and $3.00 in a group of 10. This increase in group size from 4 to 10 signiﬁcantly increases the contributions observed in the experiment. For 
an MPCR of 0.75 the group payoff resulting from a $1-investment into the public good is $3 in a group of 4 and $7.50 in a group of 10. In this case, the 
increase in group size shows no signiﬁcant impact on the average contribution. 
19 In the sense that the total payment to all group members is higher per unit invested in the public good. 
20 In later rounds of their experiment, increasing group size turns out to even negatively affect contributions for an MPCR of 0.75. 
21 As we have normalized the return of an investment in the private asset in Eq. (1) to p = 1 in our experiment. 
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Fig. 4. MPCR, N , average contributions and MPCR -distances of the connected-lab treatments run in the ﬁrst project. 
Note: Each dot in the graph represents one N - MPCR combination of the connected-lab treatments run in the ﬁrst project. It also shows the 1/ N -curve. 
The ﬁrst numbers in the yellow labels are the percentages of average contributions for each treatment, the second numbers in bold are the respective 
MPCR -distances d . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
This explanation is based on the idea that people confronted with a social dilemma can only be expected to cooperate 
if group members are aware that it is to everyone’s advantage if everyone cooperates (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010 ). 
That means the mutual beneﬁts of cooperation should be salient to the members of the group. Consequently, the more 
salient the advantage of cooperation, the more subjects can be conﬁdent that group members have understood the social 
dilemma they are in and behave cooperatively. 
We suggest that the MPCR -distance d , i.e. MPCR – 1/ N , can be interpreted as a proxy for the salience of the fact that 
contributing to a public good is mutually beneﬁcial. The MPCR and 1/ N are parameters of the payoff function, which all 
subjects are informed about. As long as the MPCR < 1/ N , investments in the public good are ineﬃcient. If 1 > MPCR > 1/ N , 
the overall eﬃciency gains from an investment in the public good increases (for a given N ) in the MPCR . Thus, given our 
salience assumption, the higher d is, the more salient the fact is that cooperation is mutually beneﬁcial. Furthermore, it 
seems plausible to assume that the positive effect of salience on cooperation rates is non-linear. As subjects become more 
aware of the mutual beneﬁts of cooperation (due to a higher salience), the additional impact of salience on cooperation 
rates should decrease. 
To develop an intuition for our hypothesis it is helpful to think of 1/ N not only as the minimal MPCR for a public good 
experiment, but also as a value that informs the group members about their relative weight in the group. The MPCR -distance 
d therefore is a measure for the difference between the MPCR – the amount a group member receives from investing one 
Eurocent into the public good – and the relative weight the respective group member has in the group with regard to group 
size (1/ N ). If the MPCR is much bigger than 1/ N , i.e., d is large, then the gains from cooperation are much higher than 
the impact the relative weight of the group member has and, thus, the more salient is the advantageousness of cooperative 
behavior to the subject. On the contrary, when d is small, the gains from cooperation do not appear to outweigh the relative 
impact the group member has on the group and, thus, cooperation declines. 
Assuming that cooperation depends (among other things) on the salience of the cooperation advantage, which can be 
approximated by the MPCR -distance, we formulate the following conjecture: 
MPCR-distance conjecture: 
1. Increasing the MPCR -distance d has a positive effect on average contributions. 
2. The higher the MPCR -distance d , the less impact an increase in d has on average contributions. 
We assume our conjecture also holds for ﬁrst-round contributions as average cooperation is rather well predicted by ﬁrst- 
round behavior (e.g., Keser and van Winden, 20 0 0; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Engel et al., 2014 ). A test of our conjecture 
based on additional treatments that provide a more complex variation of the MPCR and group size N is reported in the next 
section. In particular, we investigate the extent to which the different explanations (including our own conjecture) can 
account for observed behavior. It should be mentioned explicitly that the MPCR -distance conjecture was developed after the 
large group experiments we reported so far, but before we designed the experiments introduced in Section 3 . In Section 4 we 
will discuss the salience measured by the MPCR -distance and sketch a real world cooperation problem it can be applied to. 
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3. Experimental test of the MPCR -distance conjecture 
3.1. The interplay of N and MPCR in the previous literature 
There are alternative explanations on the interplay between N and the MPCR mentioned in the literature so far. Isaac et 
al. (1994) propose an explanation for the phenomena described in the previous sections. As a “starting point for character- 
izing the joint importance of group size and MPCR ” (p. 23) in their VCM environment the authors suggest that cooperation 
depends on the maximal advantage an eﬃcient solution has over the Nash outcome. 
π Pareto i − πNash i = z i [ ( N ∗ MP CR ) − 1 ] . (2) 
Since the endowment z i is given and ﬁxed, ( 2 ) is an aﬃne transformation of N 
∗MPCR (i.e., the total payoff resulting from 
one monetary unit invested in the public good). Referring to Isaac et al. (1994), Davis and Holt (1993) discuss a = MPCR ∗N 
as an explanatory variable for contributions. This is the ﬁrst alternative hypothesis for the interplay of the MPCR and N we 
will discuss. 22 
Davis and Holt (1993) 23 also introduce the Minimal Proﬁtable Coalition ( MPC ) as a second form of interaction between 
group size and the MPCR that might be able to explain the contributions in public good experiments (also see Holt and 
Laury, 2008 ). The MPC is the minimal percentage of group members who must contribute to the public good such that 
contributing members have at least the same payoff compared to no one contributing. If the payoff from the private asset 
is normalized to 1 and m ∗MPCR = 1 then 
MP C = m 
N 
(3) 
Davis and Holt argue that cooperative behavior will be inversely related to the MPC . The higher the MPC , the more 
diﬃcult it may be to build this coalition and the less promising it is to invest in the public good right from the start of 
the experiment. This highly plausible intuition cannot explain some of the above-mentioned results, though. For example, 
if for an MPCR of 0.75 the group size is increased from four to ten, this has been found to have only a small impact 
on contributions, although the MPC falls from 50% to 20%. 24 Davis and Holt at least implicitly assume that cooperation 
increases linearly with both the MPC and the marginal social beneﬁt ( N ∗MPCR ). This is an important point. If we compare 
the MPCR -distance d with the MPC, we ﬁnd that 
d = MP CR ( 1 − MP C ) . (4) 
This equation implies that for a given N, d and MPC would predict the same ordering of cooperation for different MPCR s 
if cooperation increases linearly in d and decreases in MPC . (1- MPC ) is the maximal share of non-cooperators that may exist 
in a group so that someone who cooperates earns at least as much as a non-cooperator. The main difference between our 
MPCR -distance conjecture and the MPC hypothesis is that it is plausible that the impact on contributions decreases in d , 
while it does not seem plausible that the impact on contributions decreases in MPC . 
At this point, it should be noted that for the solution of real-world public good problems it could be very important 
whether cooperation behavior depends on the salience of the cooperation advantages proxied by the MPCR -distance or on 
the size of the MPC . 
3.2. Experimental design and procedure 
The test of our conjecture and its comparison to alternative explanations in the second project are based on the stan- 
dard linear ten-round public good game with partner-matching described in Section 2.1 . The experimental procedure em- 
ployed for the eight new treatments is identical. Over all 13 connected-lab treatments (including the ﬁve treatments from 
Section 2 ), we changed the MPCR from very low (0.02, 0.04) to higher values (0.06, 0.12, 0.25). Likewise, we modiﬁed N from 
large (100, 60) over medium (30, 40, 20) to small (8). Recall that due to ( 1 ′ ), the MPCR is bounded by 1/ N , i.e. we could 
not conduct all treatments using the same (low) MPCR. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the additional treatments 
conducted in the second project. Fig. 5 displays all 13 connected-lab treatments in the N - MPCR space similar to Fig. 4 . 
Overall, we report 14 treatments in this paper and collect data for eight groups (independent observations) per 
treatment. 25 In total, 5,160 different subjects participated in the experiments of both projects. 
3.3. Results 
Table 4 and Fig. 5 present the average contribution rates in rounds 1 and 10 as well as over all the rounds and MPCR - 
distances for all 13 connected-lab treatments. 
In all new treatments of the second project, we ﬁnd average ﬁrst-round contributions between 25.3% and 41.9% ( Table 4 ), 
which are signiﬁcantly larger than zero; see the OLS-regressions in online Table C1 of Appendix C, columns (3) to (8), (11), 
22 Isaac et al. (1994) also give a second explanation for contributions to public goods. It is based on the idea that subjects could use their contributions 
as a signal that informs the other players about the own cooperative effort, hoping that this will motivate the other subjects to follow this example. We 
will not investigate this explanation in detail because there is evidence that the signaling approach cannot explain cooperative behavior in public good 
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Table 3 
Treatment parameters and participants’ characteristics in additional treatments. 
Treatment N MPCR Sessions/indep. obs. Lab Age in years (mean) Female dummy (mean) 
30-0.04 30 0.04 8 Connected 23.287 0.471 
30-0.06 30 0.06 8 Connected 22.729 0.525 
30-0.12 30 0.12 8 Connected 23.283 0.525 
40-0.04 40 0.04 8 Connected 22.734 0.531 
40-0.06 40 0.06 8 Connected 23.022 0.478 
40-0.12 40 0.12 8 Connected 22.784 0.569 
60-0.06 60 0.06 8 Connected 22.723 0.494 
20-0.06 20 0.06 8 Connected 22.581 0.500 
Note: The table shows the parameters of the additional eight treatments to test the MPCR -distance conjecture. In each 
treatment, we conducted eight sessions with group size N and the reported MPCR . The table also summarizes partici- 
pants’ average age and the share of female participants. 
Fig. 5. MPCR, N , average contributions, and MPCR -distances of all 13 connected-lab treatments. 
Note: Each dot in the graph represents one N - MPCR combination. It also shows the 1/ N curve. The ﬁrst numbers in the labels are the percentages of average 
contributions for each treatment, the second numbers in bold are the respective MPCR -distances d . White labels mark additional treatments, yellow labels 
mark those analyzed in Section 2 . (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this 
article.) 
and (14). The overall average cooperation amounts to between 10.3% and 30.6%. Moreover, we observe a similar pattern of 
contribution decline as in the treatments run in the ﬁrst project. Average contributions in round 10 are between 4.0% and 
18.3%. 26 Fig. 6 and Fig. D1 in online Appendix D illustrates the cooperation patterns observed in the new treatments. 
To get a ﬁrst impression whether the MPCR -distance is a decisive explanatory variable for contributions, we compare con- 
tributions in 100-0.02 and 20-0.06. Although N and the MPCR differ by a factor of 5 and of 3, respectively, the MPCR -distance 
is the same in both treatments. Therefore, our conjecture would predict very similar contributions in both treatments. Fig. 6 
demonstrates that this is indeed the case. 
For the econometric analysis of our data we use the individual contributions as well as the group average to explain three 
dependent variables: ﬁrst round contributions, average contributions, and last round contributions. These six regressions are 
run as OLS and as Tobit regressions yielding 12 different regressions. In each of these regressions we use 15 different models 
varying the explanatory variables N, the MPCR , the MPCR- distance d, MPC , and the eﬃciency measure a = MPC ∗N . All models 
are also run including a squared term of the explanatory variable to account for a non-linear inﬂuence on the dependent 
variable. In addition we include models with a term accounting for the distance of the MPCR- distance from 1/ N . We explain 
and discuss these models below. 27 
To compare the different models directly we use the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and the BIC (Bayes Information 
Criterion). BIC differs from AIC insofar as it “punishes” additional parameters more strongly. An improvement in model ﬁt is 
experiments. For example, as we have shown in Section 2 , in a group of 100 it is nearly impossible to send a signal to the other players, although the 
cooperation patterns in those groups were the same as those in groups of 8 subjects. 
23 With a reference to Isaac et al (1994) . 
24 Both a and MPC usually suggest the same ordering of contributions across treatments. 
25 The 13 connected lab treatments displayed in Fig. 5 plus the local experiment with 8 subjects. 
26 OLS-regressions reveal a signiﬁcant decay across treatments of between 2.1% and 3.7% (online Table C1). 
27 In the regressions based on individual data, we control for gender, the laboratory, and the age of the subjects. For these regressions, the standard errors 
are clustered based on sessions; for the data based on group averages we report robust standard errors. 
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Table 4 
Contributions and MPCR -distances in all connected-lab treatments. 
Treatment Contributions MPCR - distance d 
Round 1 Round 10 All rounds 
8-0.25 0.418 0.126 0.269 0.125 
(0.127) (0.101) (0.110) 
20-0.06 0.253 0.045 0.120 0.010 
(0.079) (0.035) (0.053) 
30-0.04 0.264 0.040 0.103 0.007 
(0.017) (0.032) (0.026) 
30-0.06 0.404 0.049 0.195 0.027 
(0.060) (0.020) (0.029) 
30-0.12 0.374 0.148 0.256 0.087 
(0.065) (0.028) (0.039) 
40-0.04 0.348 0.052 0.155 0.015 
(0.074) (0.034) (0.038) 
40-0.06 0.356 0.071 0.190 0.035 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.028) 
40-0.12 0.419 0.183 0.306 0.095 
(0.055) (0.06) (0.059) 
60-0.02 0.263 0.028 0.111 0.003 
(0.047) (0.013) (0.021) 
60-0.04 0.356 0.075 0.202 0.023 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.019) 
60-0.06 0.404 0.103 0.260 0.043 
(0.054) (0.031) (0.046) 
100-0.02 0.321 0.037 0.134 0.010 
(0.047) (0.009) (0.021) 
100-0.04 0.391 0.077 0.228 0.030 
(0.053) (0.008) (0.031) 
Note: The table shows the average contributions in rounds 1 and 10 as 
well as average contribution over all rounds. Standard deviations are 
given in parentheses. The MPCR-distance d is shown as well. The bold 
treatments are those analyzed in Section 2 . 
Fig. 6. Average share of contributions per round in treatments with MPRC -distance = 0.010 
Note: The graph shows the average contributions in each round as share of the endowment in treatments 100-0.02 and 20-0.06 for d = 0.01. 
indicated by smaller values of AIC and BIC. As an important example, Table 5 reports the results for the Tobit regression of 
the average contributions using the group averages as independent variables. The complete set of regressions can be found 
in online Appendix E. 
Among the 12 regressions we report in online Appendix E, model (8) is the one with the best ﬁt in 8 of the regressions. 
It includes d and d 2 as explanatory variables. In one of the remaining regressions model (9) performs better, namely in the 
OLS and the Tobit regressions on ﬁrst-round contributions using group averages. In this model, the term d 2 is replaced by 
the term measuring the distance of the MPCR- distance from 1/ N ( I d < 1/ N ) and by an interaction of this term with d . Note that 
the distance of d from 1/ N is equivalent to the distance of the MPCR from 2/ N. See the following section for details. 
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Table 5 
Tobit regression of the average group contribution. 
N MPCR d 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
X −0.0 0 0 −0.0 0 0 −0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.692 ∗∗∗ 2.458 ∗∗∗ 0.432 ∗∗ 1.467 ∗∗∗ 4.519 ∗∗∗ 1.016 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0) (0.002) (0.0 0 0) (0.165) (0.331) (0.172) (0.220) (0.602) (0.265) 
X 2 0.0 0 0 −6.744 ∗∗∗ −25.244 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0) (1.522) (5.883) 
I d < 1/ N −0.143 ∗∗∗ −0.100 ∗∗∗ −0.087 ∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.021) (0.015) 
I d < 1/ N ∗X 0.001 ∗ 0.589 3.019 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0) (0.452) (0.579) 
Constant 0.208 ∗∗∗ 0.212 ∗∗∗ 0.286 ∗∗∗ 0.145 ∗∗∗ 0.077 ∗∗∗ 0.194 ∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗∗∗ 0.091 ∗∗∗ 0.175 ∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.040) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
AIC −231.917 −229.945 −289.419 −265.802 −284.811 −294.280 −301.756 −332.282 −318.690 
BIC −223.983 −219.367 −276.197 −257.869 −274.233 −281.059 −293.823 −321.705 −305.468 
MPC a 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
X −0.003 ∗∗∗ −0.004 ∗∗ −0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.049 ∗∗∗ 0.101 ∗∗∗ 0.035 ∗∗∗
(0.0 0 0) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.024) (0.010) 
X 2 0.0 0 0 −0.009 ∗∗
(0.0 0 0) (0.004) 
I d < 1/ N −0.023 −0.145 ∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) 
I d < 1/ N ∗X 0.0 0 0 0.075 ∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.023) 
Constant 0.325 ∗∗∗ 0.353 ∗∗∗ 0.335 ∗∗∗ 0.076 ∗∗∗ 0.015 0.125 ∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.038) (0.031) (0.012) (0.026) (0.034) 
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 
AIC −308.026 −306.763 −304.320 −302.338 −304.173 −307.886 
BIC −300.093 −296.186 −291.098 −294.405 −293.595 −294.664 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ p < 0.10. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
In two cases models involving MPC yield the best ﬁt. Models (10) and (12) perform best for the OLS and the Tobit regres- 
sions on ﬁrst-round contributions using individual data. Notwithstanding, when the ﬁrst-round contributions are explained 
by individual data, models (8) and (9) show that the coeﬃcients of d and d 2 are highly signiﬁcant. 
In summary, the comprehensive econometric analysis shows that the MPCR- distance, in particular when combined with 
d 2 , has a high explanatory power. Although our MPCR- distance hypothesis and the MPC model of Davis and Holt predict 
the same ordering of contributions 28 , the models using the MPCR- distance in most of the regressions outperform the model 
using MPC . We interpret this as strong evidence for our conjecture. 
4. Discussion 
Public good problems in the real world very often are problems concerning large groups. The question of whether the 
ability to cooperate depends on the size of a group has been a topic of research at least since Mancur Olson’s famous book 
about the logic of collective action. However, Olson’s argument has not systematically been analyzed yet. 
In the ﬁrst project we provide the ﬁrst systematic analysis of what we refer to as the Olson hypothesis. Our experiments 
with groups of 60 and 100 subjects and very low MPCR s of 0.02 and 0.04 demonstrate two central results. First, the level 
of average contributions and the way it decays over the course of the experiment do not differ from those in small groups 
of 8 and a relatively high MPCR of 0.25. Therefore, we clearly ﬁnd no support in our experiment for Olson’s hypothesis that 
cooperation will break down if the individual impact on group welfare (which can be measured by the MPCR ) becomes very 
small. 
Second, the positive MPCR -effect is rather strong, while the positive group-size effect is comparatively weak. These ﬁnd- 
ings go along with the insight that an interaction between group size and MPCR seems to exist, otherwise the similarity in 
contributions between groups of 8 and an MPCR of 0.25 and a group of 100 and an MPCR of 0.04 cannot be explained. This 
28 At least in their linear versions. 
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interaction might be very important not only for understanding the behavior in public good settings in the lab, but also in 
reality, and it therefore deserves closer inspection. 
Large groups can only be expected to cooperate if the attention of all members is drawn to the fact that each person 
acting cooperatively is to everyone’s advantage. In laboratory experiments, the salience of the advantages of cooperation 
depends on the information provided to subjects regarding the public good, i.e. the payoff function’s parameters. Based on 
the ﬁndings from our ﬁrst projects, we propose the difference between the actual MPCR and 1/ N (the MPCR -distance d ) as 
a proxy for this salience. Note that each public good experiment has to use a d out of the interval [0, 1]. If d = 0 , nobody 
beneﬁts from contributions. For 0 < d < 1 the beneﬁts for each group member increase; and for d ≥ 1 a social dilemma 
does not exist any more because it becomes individually rational to cooperate. Therefore, d gives a clear indication for the 
positive effect of cooperation. For this reason, we use d as a proxy for salience. We further conjecture that the effect of d 
on cooperation is non-linear, but decreases with d . If the MPCR- distance is large enough, the mutual beneﬁt of cooperation 
can be assumed as being perceived salient by the group members. Therefore, a further increase in salience would affect 
contributions only slightly – if at all. 
In the second project we test our conjecture based on a second series of experiments. We also compare it with the 
MPC and the marginal social beneﬁt hypotheses introduced by Davis and Holt (1993) and Isaac et al. (1994) . The regression 
analyses support our explanation of the interaction between N and the MPCR . Although the MPC hypothesis also has its 
merits, our results show that the MPCR -distance performs better with respect to overall contribution levels and, moreover, 
is compatible with the observations made by Isaac et al. (1994) and Diederich et al. (2016) . 
One open question is what is meant by the statement the MPCR- distance is ‘large enough’ such that a further increase 
in d would not affect contributions any more. To answer this question, we rewrite the deﬁnition of d as follows: 
d = N MP CR − 1 
N 
(5) 
The numerator of this term is the net group beneﬁt from a contribution to the public good. 29 This net beneﬁt has to be 
larger than 0 in order to create a public good problem. 
One might argue that there exists some level of the MPCR -distance d at which the information that cooperation is mu- 
tually advantageous is almost common knowledge among group members. In that case, a further increase in d and, thus, 
in salience may affect contributions only slightly. A natural prerequisite for this would be that the net beneﬁt should be 
at least as high as the private beneﬁt from not contributing to the public good. This implies that the net beneﬁt should 
be at least 1 and therefore d = 1/ N . This implies that the salience-critical MPCR is 2/ N . The minimal MPCR of 1/ N and the 
salience-critical MPCR of 2/ N are the boundaries between which the ( N, MPCR ) combinations are such that a social dilemma 
exists. But the dilemma is not very salient, because the net group beneﬁt of a contribution is smaller than the individual 
proﬁt resulting from an investment in the private asset. Thus, variations of d between 1/ N and 2/ N should have a rather 
strong impact on contributions while variations above 2/ N should have a less pronounced impact. Unfortunately, the design 
of our experiments does not allow this additional conjecture to be tested. So we have to leave testing this conjecture for 
further research. 
However, even without the additional conjecture concerning the salience-critical MPCR- distance, our results have an im- 
portant implication for the experimental investigation of public good situations. They demonstrate that the behavioral dy- 
namics are the same in small groups with a high MPCR and in large groups with a low MPCR . Thus, small groups seem to 
be well suited to cover essential characteristics of public goods in a laboratory situation. For this reason, our theory should 
also be applicable to experiments with small groups. Fig. 7 shows that this actually is the case. 
Fig. 7 exhibits the average MPCR/ group-size combinations as well as the respective average contribution levels observed 
in previous small group experiments. These observations are plotted against the 1/ N curve. Fig. 7 suggests the correlation 
between average contribution levels and MPCR to be strong in the neighborhood of the 1/ N curve, but becomes weak or 
non-existent if the vertical distance to this curve is larger. For example, for a group of ten and a MPCR of 0.3 the average 
contribution reported in the literature is about 30%. For the same group size and a slightly higher MPCR of 0.375 the reported 
average contribution increases to 54%, while a further doubling of the MPCR has no additional effect in three out of the four 
reported cases (and in the fourth case the effect is also not signiﬁcant). 
Our explanation of behavior in public good experiments implies that the salience of the social dilemma is of great im- 
portance for the investigation of real public good problems. For example, in the case of environmental problems it would 
be important that, ﬁrst, people know that their own cooperative contribution is eﬃciency enhancing and that, second, they 
are convinced that the social dilemma situation and the mutual beneﬁt of contributions is common knowledge for all the 
people in the group. 
Let us ﬁnish our paper with an – admittedly speculative – example on how our notion of salience might relate to reality 
and on the impact the salience of cooperation advantages could have. The example concerns climate change. The decisive 
factor probably is how well people are informed about the causes and consequences of greenhouse gas emissions. This in 
turn will depend on how intensively this issue is dealt with in the media and in the political debate. Germany is a good 
example for climate-policy relevant topics being frequently discussed in the media. We would interpret this as attracting the 
German population’s attention to the beneﬁts of climate protection making the topic very salient. This example indicates 
29 One Euro invested in the public asset results in a total payment to the group of N ∗MPCR . The opportunity cost of this investment is 1. 
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Fig. 7. MPCR, N, 1/N curve, and average contributions found in the literature for different combinations of MPCR and N . 
Note: The 1/ N -curve represents, for each group size, the minimum MPCR required to create a public good situation. The dots exhibit average contributions 
found in the literature for different combinations of MPCR and N . Numbers in parenthesis correspond to the following references: (1) and (2) Isaac et al. 
(1984) , (3) Isaac et al. (1988) , (4) Isaac et al. (1994) , (5) and (6) Goeree et al. (2002) , (7) Carpenter (2007) , and (8) Nosenzo et al. (2015) . 
that links to phenomena in reality exist that may be supportive to the salience hypothesis developed in this paper. Further 
research would, however, be needed to show the correctness of our interpretation. 
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Appendix A. Olson’s theory and the VCM literature 
In his book, Olson assumes that in small groups, organizing collective action is easier because these groups are “twice 
blessed” ( Olson, 1965 , p.63): First, individual group members may have an incentive to provide the public good because 
their advantage is greater than the cost of providing it. Secondly, small groups can develop “social incentives” (Olson, p. 63) 
that favor cooperative behavior. Face-to-face communication, which is possible in small groups, works in the same direction. 
In large, latent groups, on the other hand, the contribution that the individual group member can make to the provision of 
a public good is so small that it is hardly noticed by the other group members. Olson concludes that cooperative behavior 
in large groups is therefore not rational 
Experimental research, which has dealt with the private provision of public goods since the mid-1980s, makes use of 
the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) introduced by Isaac et al. (1984) to map the speciﬁc incentive structure of a 
social dilemma in the laboratory as described in Section 2.1 . 
For the payoff function [1] with the parameters [1 ′ ] the static game has a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies 
and the ﬁnitely repeated game has an unique subgame perfect equilibrium and in all equilibria there is no cooperation. 
In this respect, the VCM paradigm differs from Olson’s statements. Small groups have the same problem as large groups, 
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because cooperation is not rational independent of the group size. To model what Olson has described as typical for small 
groups, one would either have to use a different payoff function (which creates an interior solution), or introduce strong 
heterogeneity between players, or allow social interaction, for example by allowing players to communicate with each other, 
leading to reputation effects. 
Experimental VCM research has focused, with a few exceptions, on the behavior of small groups (usually with 4–6 mem- 
bers) and relatively high MPCR values ranging from 0.25 to 0.7. Some of the important results obtained can be summarized 
as follows: The Nash equilibrium (pure free riding behavior of all players) is not observed. Nevertheless, the eﬃciency losses 
are substantial ( > 70%) especially because the contributions to the public good decrease when the experiment is repeated. 
Communication among subjects increases cooperation. Brosig et al. (2006) show that it is above all face-to-face communi- 
cation that enables considerable cooperation. 
These experimental results could be interpreted as a conﬁrmation of Olson’s theory on cooperation in small groups. As 
long as a group is relatively small, there are mechanisms that at least potentially ensure that cooperation takes place, even 
if it is too small to generate eﬃciency. The strong effect of face-to-face communication also corresponds to what Olson said 
about small groups. In keeping with Olson’s intentions, the cooperation problem is thus relaxed for small groups. In fact, 
anonymous experiments using the VCM do not adequately reﬂect the cooperation problem of small groups. In reality, the 
members of small groups facing a cooperation problem normally do not act anonymously. They communicate with each 
other (mostly face-to-face) and develop social incentives or follow social norms. Some of the experience that people gain 
in real small groups is obviously also effective in experiments under anonymous conditions and generates a low degree of 
cooperation. 
The VCM is much more appropriate for describing the cooperation problem of large groups. Face-to-face communication 
and direct social interaction play no role here. Olson’s central argument is that in large groups not only the mechanisms 
that can support cooperation are missing, but also the MPCR , the individual contribution that the individual group member 
can make, becomes smaller and ﬁnally is no longer perceptible to the other group members. One could also formulate it 
this way: The larger the group (and the smaller the MPCR ), the better the VCM depicts the situation described by Olson and 
the more likely it may be to observe the Nash equilibrium in an experiment. 
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Appendix B. Instructions 
Experimental instructions Treatment 100-0.02 
(Instructions for other treatments can be provided upon request) 
Preliminary : You are participating in an economic experiment focusing on decision making. If you have any questions 
after having read these instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. We will then come to your cubicle. 
While participating in the experiment, you have to take a sequence of decisions. You will earn money. But, how much 
money you earn will depend both on your decision and the decisions of the other participants. Your total earnings will be 
paid in cash at the end of the experiment. Both your decisions and your payoff are conﬁdential, i.e. no other participant will 
receive this information. 
You are part of a group of 100 participants. These 100 people are located in four experimental laboratories across Ger- 
many, connected by Internet. All the group members have received the same instructions. Furthermore, the laboratories are 
linked with a video connection. If you have any doubts about this procedure, please take a look at our video conference. 
You and the other 99 group members are facing the following identical decision situation during 10 consecutive rounds. 
In each round, you receive an endowment of 120 euro cents. You decide how much of this endowment you want to “keep”, 
and how much you want to “contribute”. Each contribution x creates an amount of 0.02 × for each group member (including 
the contributor). That means that for every euro cent you contribute, the members of the whole group will be paid 2 euro 
cents (0.02 ×100) each. For each euro cent you contribute, you will be paid 0.02 euro cents, like all other group members. 
That part of your endowment that you do not contribute (i. e. that you “keep”), you keep for yourself. 
Summing up in one formula, your earnings in euro cents per round are as follows: 
120 – Your Contribution + 0.02 × (Sum of all group members’ contributions) 
Please note that your contribution per round can be any amount between 0 and 120 euro cents and that all group 
members are facing an identical decision situation. After each round you will be informed of the amount you kept, your 
contribution, the average contribution of all 100 group members, your payoff based on the contributions of all group 
members, your payoff in the respective round and your payoff cumulated over all rounds. In addition, you will see a 
table listing the same information for all previous rounds. 
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Practice rounds : Before starting the experiment, you have the opportunity to decide in three practice rounds. In these 
practice rounds, the average contribution of all other group members will be given since it is randomly generated. Further- 
more, your own contribution will be preset, too. Your task is to calculate the earnings in the respective round yourself. 
To that end, we will provide you with a calculator, paper, and pencil. After entering your solution into the respective box, 
please click on the “Solution” button. You then will be informed whether your answer is right or wrong. The calculation 
method will also be shown. If you have any questions during the practice rounds, please raise your hand. Once the practice 
rounds are over, the experiment will immediately start automatically. 
Payoff: Please stay in your cubicle after all 10 rounds have ended. You will be called individually to receive your payoff. 
Please hand in your participation number (which you drew at the beginning of the experiment) and enter your name and 
signature in the payment list. Please leave the laboratory after receiving your money. 
Finally, we would like to ask you to not talk to anybody about the content of this experiment to avoid inﬂuencing future 
participants. Thank you for your cooperation! 
Appendix C to E 
See supplementary material. 
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